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Abstract
We document the association between a rms payout policy and its stocks liquidity.
In particular, we show that dividend-paying rms have a more liquid market for their
stock and measures of a stocks liquidity is positively linked to its probability of being a
dividend payer. Furthermore, this link between dividends and liquidity is stronger when
shareholders are more powerful. This is consistent with a mechanism in which payout
decisions act as a commitment not to invest: by distributing cash, the rm reduces
its potential for internal equity nancing, raising its cost of capital and leading to less
investment. Such a mechanism may lead to less volatile stock prices and potentially
to a decrease in the adverse selection costs faced by liquidity-constrained shareholders,
increasing stock price liquidity. When shareholders have more power, liquidity would be
more strongly linked with dividends as managers would be more likely to pay dividends
to meet shareholderspreference for liquidity.
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I Introduction
Payout decisions have an impact but are also a¤ected by liquidity conditions of sharehold-
ers. Most straightforwardly, distributing cash to shareholders increase their cash balance,
and hence, relaxes their liquidity constraints. More interestingly, the decision to distribute
cash may have a dynamic relationship with the properties of the stock price, and hence,
the liquidity of the stock in the market place. Such a relationship could arise through
the commitment not to invest: distributing cash reduces the rms potential for inter-
nal equity nancing, raises the cost of external capital, and leads to less investment. In
the extreme, a rm would pay cash out only when it envisions no worthy investment op-
portunities because internal nancing is cheaper. With less investment and assuming cash
ows from existing operations are always more predictable than ows from risky investment
projects, uncertainty in payo¤s would be reduced and stock price volatility may subside,
decreasing the adverse selection costs faced by liquidity-constrained shareholders. In this
paper, we present a toy model demonstrating this mechanism and empirically analyze the
link between between payout policy and stock liquidity by adding liquidity variables to the
list of rm characteristics that determine the propensity to pay dividends.
The novel part of the paper is the study of a corporate nance decision taking market
microstructure elements into account. We consider a situation where shareholdersneed for
liquidity is linked to the rms decision to pay dividends and/or engage in share repurchases.
We think of shareholders as agents that face a trade-o¤ between expected returns and
liquidity. In equilibrium, some rms are willing to forgo investments and accept potentially
lower growth prospects in exchange for a more liquid market for their shares and they
distribute cash.
If one interprets the decision to pay dividends as a pre-commitment to invest less in
opportunities that are riskier than its existing operations, it is easy to see that by paying
dividends a rm may be able to reduce its earnings volatility. In a market with informed
agents, a(n uninformed) shareholder that is hit by a liquidity shock will face adverse selection
when trading. Furthermore, these adverse selection costs will be lower the less risky
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the company is (an intuition reminiscent of Kyle (1985)). In other words, assymmetric
information about the returns will play a bigger role when the investments undertaken are
risky and the stock price, as a consequence, is more volatile. So, by paying dividends or
repurchasing shares, a company would a¤ect the volatility and liquidity of its stock. If
shareholders do indeed care about liquidity and rms care about shareholders, we should
observe an e¤ect of liquidity on the decision to make payouts to shareholders.1
This reasoning leads to several testable conjectures. First, dividend-paying rms have
a more liquid market. Therefore, measures of liquidity should be positively associated
with the probability that a rm is a dividend payer. Second, payers are less volatile as
they tend to use dividends as a commitment device and not to undertake risky investments.
Accordingly, shareholders of rms with more investment opportunities face more volatile
returns and higher adverse selection costs because of the uncertainty surrounding these
investments. Finally, increased shareholder power leads to an increase in the likelihood
that a rm is a payer as shareholders like more liquidity.2
Our empirical analysis closely follows the work of Fama and French (2001) (FF from
now on). FF analyzes possible explanations for the decline in the number of dividend
paying rms. They rst identify the characteristics of dividend paying rms, and then ask
if the decline can be explained by changes in the prevalence of these characteristics. They
argue that even after controlling for the characteristics, which include size, protability,
and growth opportunities, the decline persists. In other words, the decline can be better
explained by a generalized reduction in the propensity to pay, rather than by a change in the
characteristics of rms. We build on their work arguing that potentially important variables
were excluded from their analysis, namely liquidity measures and proxies for shareholder
power. We do not, however, concentrate so much on the reasons for the decline, but rather
on the variables that seem to be important in determining the likelihood of a rm being a
dividend payer.
1Throughout the paper we focus on dividends but the results are also veried for share repurchases.
2One should think about this and the rst implication together: Liquidity should be of greater importance
for the decision to pay dividends for rms that have a high level of shareholder power.
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The potential power to signal strategy and prospects to the market has been one of the
main features of dividends analyzed in the literature.3 We depart considerably from this
approach by assuming that establishing its type is not the rms main or sole concern in
choosing their payout policy. Their decision of whether or not to pay dividends actually
determines the characteristics of their payo¤s. The interesting point, and the main object
of analysis in this paper, is the fact that liquidity costs generated by asymmetric information
di¤er across rms depending on whether they are dividend payers or not. Bhattacharya
(1979) also argues that agents liquidity needs may be related to the dividend payment
decision. However, the mechanism leading to this result is di¤erent. In Bhattacharya
(1979), agentsurgency comes from di¤ering planning horizons, while here we think of it
as coming from a shock. We focus on the interaction between the payout policy (and
the availability of funds for investments) and the liquidity costs faced by shareholders and,
consequently, the rms nal value.
Baker and Wurgler (2002a, b) analyze the impact of a measure of dividend premium
on the decision to initiate payment. They develop a stylized behavioral model to suggest
that the stock price premium carried by dividend-paying rms explains why rms decide to
pay or stop paying dividends and present some suggestive evidence to support their theory.
Their approach aims to explain the downward trend in the propensity to pay, hence they
concentrate on the time series dimension.4 Conversely, our approach is mostly concentrated
on the cross-section variation as we are interested in explaining the decision to pay dividends
as a function of rm characteristics. We propose a mechanism that can shed light into the
existence of the dividend premium. Investors in need of liquidity may display a preference
for the dividend payers and this preference can show up in the form of a premium on
the dividend-paying stocks. Thus, the windfall created by shareholders liquidity needs
would be observationally equivalent to a dividend premium changing through time. Our
results suggest that it may be the case that it is not the dividend premium that drives the
3See Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), Makhija and Thompson (1986), Williams (1988),
Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997), and Allen and Michaely (2002), among others.
4Actually, using a variable such as dividend premium makes it impossible to use the cross-section varia-
tion.
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propensity to pay, but rather that the liquidity gains from paying drives this propensity
and at the same time leads to the dividend premium.
Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) test the information content of changes in divi-
dends with respect to the earnings of the rm, which is a common implication in signaling
models. The question is whether the rms are signaling a change expected to happen in
the future or a change already realized in the past. Their result that rms are in fact
signaling the past is consistent with our ndings. There, rms that initiate or increase
dividends have experienced an increase in earnings, but do not show unexpected increases
in the future. Firms that cut dividends have experienced decrease in earnings in the past,
but show increases in the future. Our story also asserts that, in order to pay dividends, the
rm needs to have had positive earnings. However, in agreement with their ndings, these
rms are not expected to show any further increase in protability, potentially because they
are committing not to invest and potentially passing on protable opportunities. Similarly,
rms that decide not to pay dividends experience a decrease in earnings since funds are
diverted to a risky investment opportunity. Again in conformity with their results, these
rms are expected to show signicant increase in earnings in the future. Hence, our hy-
pothesis accords with results that have empirical support in the existing literature. Other
implications, concerning the links between dividends and liquidity as well as between div-
idends and shareholder power are new and has received little attention making this paper
one of the few documenting these relationships.
Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt (2007), in a coincident paper, also investigate the interac-
tion between payout policy and stock market liquidity. They, however, conclude that there
exists a negative relationship between dividends and stock market liquidity, interpreting this
as a sign that investors view dividends and liquidity as substitutes. Yet, their empirical
analysis is fragmented in the sense that all regressions are conducted in sub-samples distin-
guished by three di¤erent time periods (1963-1977, 1978-1992, 1993-2003). As we show, in
the whole sample period, the sign of the relationship is reversed. Hence, we demonstrate
that the interaction between dividends and stock market liquidity is not necessarily as it
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is depicted elsewhere in the literature. Moreover, the main feature that distinguishes this
paper is the fact that we study an interesting channel that may have a bearing on this
relationship, namely, the potential e¤ect on investment decisions and stock price return
distribution, beyond the straightforward channel that dividends can relax shareholders
liquidity constraints.
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), in another coincident paper, look at the relation-
ship between corporate governance and cash holdings. They nd a somewhat counterin-
tuitive result that poor governance quality is associated with low cash balances but that
poorly-governed rms are less likely to initiate or increase dividends. Their explanation
that managers at poorly-governed rms try to avoid high cash balances in order to divert
attention from poor governance quality only partially t the picture. We o¤er a novel
explanation for the latter relationship where stronger shareholder rights are associated with
higher propensity to pay dividends through the relation between dividend payment decision
and stock market liquidity. Correspondingly, this is the rst study, to the best of our
knowledge, to demonstrate the interactive nature of the relationship between dividends and
the combination of corporate governance and stock market liquidity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the background for the conjectures
to be empirically tested. Section III presents the empirical analysis. Section IV concludes.
II The Liquidity-Payout Hypothesis
In this section, we introduce the main hypotheses and conjectures providing an intuitive
explanation for the potential relevance of liquidity to payout policy. For a more formal
presentation, we refer the interested reader to the appendix where we develop a model that
delivers the implications discussed here. Note that the objective is to build an intuitive
background for the relationships to be studied later rather than to construct a full-blown
model of payout policy.
We think of an economy with a representative rm, whose stock is traded in an imper-
fectly competitive market. The rm is initially endowed with an average amount of D per
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share, in cash, seen as free cash-ow accumulated from previous activities. The decision
faced by the manager is whether to pay out D as dividends or to hold on to the cash. If
the rm pays dividends, then its nal value is distributed as eV0.5 Otherwise, the rm will
have an option to invest. With probability 1 p, it has a protable investment opportunity
with cost D. With complementary probability p, no opportunity presents itself, and hence,
there is no investment. If investment takes place, the rms nal value is given by a random
variable eVI . If no investment takes place, then its nal value is given by eV0 +D. Let eVg
be the random variable that represents the mixture described above. More precisely, it
is a lottery that with probability 1  p gives eVI and with complementary probability giveseV0 +D. Under suitable conditions, one obtains that the variance of eVg is larger than that
of eV0 +D: In the end, we have a representative rm that chooses to be one of two types:
non-payer or payer. A shareholder of the growth rm is entitled to  eVg and a shareholder
of the value rm is entitled to 
eV0 +D, where  is the number of shares a shareholder
has.
The intuition behind the assumption that if a rm pays dividends it foregoes all possi-
bility to invest is linked to the well-known theory of a pecking order in nancing decisions,
i.e., that internal equity is favored to external nancing (see, e.g., Myers (1984)). The
main idea is not that dividend paying rms have no access to nancial markets, but rather
that, for those rms that have little access to external nancing, retained earnings may
be the only way to invest at the margin. Hence, constrained rms that choose to pay
are essentially foregoing all investment opportunities. This is consistent with the results
in Fama and French (2002) showing that rms with higher dividend payout ratios invest
less. Empirically, we would then expect that the characteristics of payers we identify be-
low should be more pronounced for those rms that have limited access to cheap external
nancing. We address this issue directly in our econometric analysis.
Next, we introduce a potential need for liquidity on the part of the shareholders. What
we have in mind is a situation where the market is a modication of Kyle (1985), where the
5Throughout the paper, payo¤s represent what accrues to the holder of one share.
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liquidity traders are now shareholders. More precisely, we assume that each shareholder
has an additional demand (or supply) of euk, independently distributed of all other random
variables. Therefore, if euk < (>)0, they might need to sell (buy) some shares in the market.
When hit by the liquidity shock, shareholders have to trade against informed agents and
face a market with adverse selection costs. These costs are a function of the characteristics
of the rm. In turn, it is the choice of the rms type, payer or non-payer, that shapes
these characteristics. Accordingly, when deciding to pay dividends, the rm would take
the liquidity needs of its shareholders into account.
Given this description one can think about the dividend policy as a sort of commitment
device. Once a payout is announced, the manager commits himself not to undertake or to
limit exposure to risky investments. In other words, cash at hand is less risky than any
project with uncertain outcome. This reduces the potential adverse selection (and trading)
costs of liquidity-strapped shareholders.
Suppose the rm decides not to pay dividends and retain earnings. So, the option to
invest is still viable and the rm is tagged as a non-payer and its stock is a risky asset payingeVg with price Pg. Similarly, the payers stock is an asset paying eV0+D with price Pv. In a
Kyle-type framework, the depth of the market is inversely proportional to the rms value
volatility. Hence, intuitively, the more volatile the new investment opportunity, the lower
is the stocks market depth. So, one can assert that a non-payers stock is as liquid as its
growth opportunities are safe. The expected prot of the informed trader is proportional
to the volatility of the rms value. Since this is a zero-sum market, so is the aggregate
loss to the shareholders. Based on these intuitions, we have the following:
Conjecture 1 The market for non-paying rms is less liquid;
Conjecture 2 Non-paying rms have more volatile stock prices than payers;
Conjecture 3 Adverse selection costs are directly related to investment opportunities, that
is, it is the possibility of risky investment that leads to higher adverse selection costs.
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A possible interpretation that could o¤er an intuitive insight into these conjectures is
that dividend-paying rms o¤er the shareholders a more liquid stock to compensate for less
favorable growth perspectives. This helps them hedge part of their liquidity shock. On the
other hand, shareholders of a non-payer pay a price for higher expected returns by having
to face thinner or less liquid markets.
Now, if the manager cares about shareholders, his decision to pay cash out will depend
on liquidity measures. We think of the manager as attaching some weight, denoted by 	,
to the shareholdersper-capita well-being and complementary weight on his own well-being.
When deciding on whether or not to pay dividends, he maximizes a weighted average of his
expected utility and shareholdersper-capita expected utility. One should think about this
parameter as a measure of corporate governance. Boards of rms with strong governance
will likely make sure that managers do not act selshly and do indeed take into consideration
shareholdersobjective. At the same time, no matter how well governed a rm is, managers
always have some degree of freedom that allows them to put some weight on their own utility.
This leads to two more conjectures:
Conjecture 4 The decision to pay dividends depends on liquidity, since liquidity is a¤ected
by dividend payment and shareholders care about liquidity;
Conjecture 5 The latter e¤ect is more pronounced for well-governed rms.
III Empirical Analysis
Here we assemble the main empirical conjectures developed above, explain the data we use
to corroborate them, and present the results.
A Conjectures
We have ve main empirical conjectures that can be tested against the data:
1. The rst empirical conjecture that should be tested, as it underlies the hypothesis,
is that dividend-paying rms have a more liquid market. We use several liquidity
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measures to achieve robustness of results to the choice of this variable, explained in
more detail in the next subsection.
2. Another prediction is that non-dividend-paying rms are more volatile. This follows
primarily from the assumption that non-payers have a more volatile nal value and/or
earnings. Therefore, we present a test of whether rms that do not pay dividends
have more volatile market-to-book ratios and earnings per assets. Finally, we also
test whether stock prices of non-payers are more volatile than those of payers.
3. The links present in our hypotheses point to a relationship between adverse selection
costs and investment. It is the commitment not to invest in risky opportunities,
achieved through dividend payment, that reduces adverse selection costs. Therefore,
we should observe a positive relationship between investment and adverse selection
costs.
4. More directly, one has to test if liquidity helps explain dividend payment probabil-
ity. To do that, we explore the relationship between liquidity and the probability of
being a payer, carrying out a regression as in FF with the addition of liquidity as an
explanatory variable.
5. In the extreme case, liquidity should only matter when shareholders interests are
taken into account by the management. So, shareholder power should help explain
the likelihood of being a payer. In order to test this, we construct a proxy for 	 using
a measure of shareholder power in running the rm. Then, we modify our liquidity
variables using this new measure, creating a variable that captures the ideas discussed
above.
On top of that, one could argue that the e¤ect of liquidity on the probability of being a
payer should depend on access to nancial markets, since constrained rms that pay divi-
dends are committing to forego risky investment opportunities. We also address this in the
empirical analysis. It is worth noting that our conjectures deal with the distribution of free
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cash ows, without distinguishing between dividend payments and share repurchases. From
an empirical standpoint, one can argue that the implications listed above should hold for
both types of cash distribution. To address this issue, we explore the relationship between
liquidity and share repurchases as well, even though the bulk of our analysis concentrates
on dividends.
B Data Description
Data mostly come from Compustat and CRSP. We use the selection criteria and variable
derivations as described in FF. The Compustat sample for calendar year t is composed
of the rms with scal year-ends in t that have available data for total assets, stock price
and shares outstanding at the end of the scal year, income before extraordinary items,
interest expense, dividends per share, and preferred dividends. In addition, to account
for the value of preferred stock, the rms must have one of the following: preferred stock
liquidating value, preferred stock redemption value, or preferred stock carrying value. To
use as the book equity variable, we require the availability of either stockholders equity, or
liabilities, or common equity, and preferred stock par value. In order to be able to calculate
the growth in assets, AG, total assets must be available in year t and t  1. Additionally,
rms with book equity below $250,000 or assets below $500,000 are excluded from the
sample. We also use balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit, income
statement deferred taxes, purchases of common and preferred stock, sales of common and
preferred stock, and common treasury stock when available, but rms are not required to
have these items available in order to be included in the sample. By constraining the
corresponding CRSP share codes to be 10 or 11, we ensure that the rms in our Compustat
sample are publicly traded. Moreover, we exclude the scal years when a rm fails to be
in the CRSP database at its scal year-end. The CRSP sample consists of NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ securities with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11. Firms are required to have
price and shares outstanding data available for December of year t in order to be included
in the dataset for that year. Utilities and nancial rms are excluded from both Compustat
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and CRSP samples. Practically, we extend the dataset used in FF by adding data for the
period between 1999 and 2002 so that our data covers the years from 1963 to 2002.6
The dependent variable in the regressions is pay, which is a dummy that takes on the
value of 1 if a company has paid dividends in a given year. More specically, a rm is
considered to be a dividend payer in calendar year t if the dividends per share are positive
by the ex date in the last scal year that ends in year t. We construct the rest of the
variables used in the regression analysis based on annual data according to the following
derivations:
 Assets (A) = Total Assets;
 Book Equity (BE) = Stockholders Equity [or Common Equity + Preferred Stock
Par Value or A   Liabilities]   Preferred Stock Liquidating Value [or Preferred Stock
Redemption Value, or Preferred Stock Par Value] + Balance Sheet Deferred Taxes
and Investment Tax Credit if available   Post Retirement Asset if available;
 Market Equity (ME) = Stock Price  Shares Outstanding;
 Market-to-Book Ratio or Value per Assets (V perA) = A BE+MEA ;
 Earnings Before Interest (E) = Earnings Before Extraordinary Items + Interest Ex-
pense + Income Statement Deferred Taxes if available;
 Protability measured by the Ratio of Earnings to Assets (EperA) = EA ;
 Asset Growth (AG) = At At 1A .
The remaining set of variables in the regressions are computed using CRSP daily stock
tapes. These include market capitalization percentile rank (MCRank) and measures of
stock market liquidity. Measures of liquidity we use are:7
6We do not extend the dataset further as we want to refrain from any potential signicant changes in the
data that may have been introduced by the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to the
stock market downturn and corporate governance scandals afterwards.
7 In addition to the liquidity measures mentioned here, we do robustness checks with several others.
Specically, we use turnover and the "liquidity-sensitivity" measure developed by Pastor and Stambaugh
12
 E¤ective bid-ask spread (MeanSpread);8
 Trading volume in logs (MeanV olume);
 Proportion of days in which the stock has a zero return (PropZeroRet);9
 Absolute percentage price change per dollar of trading volume or price impact of the
order ow (AmihudIlliq).10
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. The table contains a correlation matrix for
all the (il)liquidity variables. The variables seem to be correlated, albeit not too highly.
And all, but one, correlations have the right sign. The only puzzling result is the positive
correlation between the spread and volume measures, however, it is pretty close to zero.
To obtain a proxy for shareholder power, we follow the descriptions in Gompers, Ishii
and Metrick (2003). The data come from Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)
publications. Company documents (charters, bylaws, etc.) are searched for the provision
of certain corporate governance rules such as voting rights, director/o¢ cer protection and
takeover defenses. Then, an index is formed by adding one point for each provision that
presumably restricts shareholder rights. By construction, a higher value of the index
means increasing managerial power. We merge the governance index variable, GIndex,
to the Compustat/CRSP sample by matching according to rm permanent identication
numbers. This dataset covers the period between 1991 and 2002. Based on this proxy for
(2003). These, however, do not produce results as signicant as the ones presented. Turnover is recognized
as a highly awed measure of liquidity (see, for instance, Lee and Swaminathan (2000)). The liquidity-
sensitivity measure, as Pastor and Stambaugh themselves point out, is not robust and varies a lot with
di¤erent specications. Hence, its suitability for our purposes is questionable.
8Spread measures derived from monthly tapes can be problematic. The value computed turns out to be
a poor indicator of real costs associated with trading the stock because it reects the di¤erence between the
lowest bid and highest ask over several days of trading. In regressions not reported here for brevity, we do
use spread and volume measures derived from monthly tapes and obtain similar results.
9This measure follows Mei, Scheinkman and Xiong (2004) that uses the proportion of no-price-change
days experienced by a stock in a time period as a measure negatively related to liquidity. They rely on
the results of Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999), where it is shown that this is an e¤ective measure of
liquidity for U.S. stocks.
10The last measure follows Amihud (2002) that calculates the average ratio of the daily absolute return to
the dollar trading volume on that day to nd the illiquidity of a stock. He aims to capture Kyles concept
of illiquidity. Similar measures based on returns and volume are used commonly in market microstructure
literature.
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shareholder power, we create a dummy variable called DemDummy, where DemDummy
is 1 if corporate governance index, GIndex, is smaller than or equal to 5 and 0 otherwise.
As a proxy for adverse selection costs, we use the degree of informed trading, a measure
developed in Easley, Hvidkjaer and OHara (2002). This measure, PIN , is dened as the
probability that the opening trade is information-based and is calculated using transactions
data from the Institute for the Study of Security Markets (ISSM) and NYSE Trade and
Quote (TAQ) database. The basic idea is to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of
the structural parameters in a sequential trading model for each stock on a yearly basis.11
The sample consists of all NYSE/AMEX stocks for which the estimates were obtainable
for the period between 1983 and 2001. In addition to using PIN as a control for adverse
selection costs in the regressions where pay is the dependent variable, we also use it to test
if the extent of adverse selection depends on investment opportunities as implied by our
hypotheses.
Following FF, we use asset growth as a proxy for investment opportunities. We also use
an alternative measure of investment opportunities, Inv, which is an augmented version (as
recommended by Kaplan and Zingales (1997)) of what is dened as investment intensity by
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and calculated as the ratio of capital expenditure to net property,
plant, and equipment.
To address concerns that the e¤ect of liquidity on the probability of being a payer
depends on how constrained the rm is, we construct a measure of leverage, Lev, dened
as the book value of long term debt divided by market equity (ME). We use two dummy
variables to capture the rms with high leverage: hi_lev1,which takes the value of one for
rm i at time t if Levit is above the average Lev at time t plus two standard deviations, and
hi_lev2, which takes the value of one for rms that are in the highest quintile of Lev at
time t. These dummies act as proxy for access to cheap external nancing. The idea here
is that highly leveraged rms would face high costs of external nancing, especially in the
bond market. So, these rms upon paying dividends would commit not to invest because
11We refer the reader to Easley, Hvidkjaer, and OHara (2002) for more details on this issue.
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they would have no or little cheap funds available.
As mentioned before, we also use share repurchases to see if the relation between distrib-
ution of free cash ow and liquidity persists independently of the form of payout. Note that
we are simply interested in the repurchases that would qualify as a substitute to dividends.
Therefore, share repurchases carried out to create resources for employee stock option or
ownership plans and for mergers and acquisitions should be excluded from our measure.
For that matter, we calculate the annual change in treasury stock. We construct this vari-
able by rst calculating the di¤erence in common treasury stock from year to year.12 If we
end up with a positive value, then we set the dummy variable for repurchases to 1 and 0
otherwise.
C Results
Our empirical strategy follows the framework of FF trying to understand the main deter-
minants of the decision to pay dividends. Our major contributions come from the addition
of liquidity and shareholder power variables to the explanatory variables guided by the
intuition developed in Section II.
Table 2 presents evidence supporting our rst conjecture. All four measures of liquidity
used (spread, volume, proportion of days without a price change, and the price impact of
order ow) endorse our results. Both spread and proportion of trading days with zero
return are statistically lower for companies that pay dividends.13 In a similar spirit, the
price impact of order ow is signicantly greater for non-payers. In that simple test,
comparing the average daily trading volume for payers and non-payers also gives support to
our prediction that companies that pay dividends would have more liquidity. An immediate
concern is the impact of size on our measures even when the test is conducted on matched
pairs. We would expect size to be relevant for all, but especially for trading volume.
Thus, we conduct additional tests for liquidity di¤erences between payers and non-payers
12One complication is caused by the fact that some companies use the retirement method. In those
instances, we calculate the net repurchases by subtracting the sales of common and preferred stock from the
purchases.
13Note that lower spread and lower proportion of zero return days both indicate more liquidity.
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controlling for the rm size in OLS regressions. Actually, all measures still indicate that
payers have a more liquid market in that case. So, for two companies of similar size, the
stock of the one that pays dividends is likely to have a higher volume and smaller spread
as well as it tends to be traded more frequently and the price impact of these trades would
be less.
Table 3 exhibits evidence that rms that do not pay dividends are more volatile. In
particular, both market-to-book and earnings per assets are more volatile for non-payers
than for payers. These results support our reasoning that, if the rm does not pay dividends,
it invests in an ex-ante protable but risky project that adds to the volatility of its nal
asset value and hence market value. In line with the last part, the table also shows that
the stock prices of non-payers are more volatile than those of payers.
In order to test our conjecture that more rigorous investment activity is associated
with adverse selection costs, we estimate a model where PIN is the dependent variable and
asset growth (proxy for investment opportunities, as in FF) is the explanatory variable with
the addition of several other variables as controls. Table 4 presents the results of these
tests for di¤erent specications. The evidence is strikingly supportive of the hypothesis
that investment is directly related to adverse selection. The results with the alternative
investment opportunity measure, Inv, are qualitatively the same.
Table 5 explores the relationship between liquidity, as measured by spread, volume,
proportion of zero return days, and the percent price change per dollar volume, and the
probability of being a payer, as in FF, with the addition of liquidity as an explanatory
variable. We run yearly logit regressions and report the average coe¢ cients and their
signicance, following Fama and MacBeth (1973). We also reproduce the results from FF
for easy comparison. We see that, even after controlling for the variables used by FF, we
still obtain that the liquidity variable has additional explanatory power, while coe¢ cients
on the other variables are of similar value. Liquidity is strongly positively correlated with
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the probability of being a dividend payer.14 ;15 Actually, liquidity exhibits a considerable
impact as indicated by its relatively large coe¢ cient when compared to the other variables.
Economically, one standard deviation drop in the spread corresponds to a 2.22 percent
increase, almost a quarter standard deviation, in the probability of being a dividend payer.
When the proportion of zero return days is used as proxy, one standard deviation matches a
17.05 percent change, or almost two standard deviations. An interesting point is to realize
that the coe¢ cient of the size variable is the one that changes most dramatically when
the liquidity proxy is added to the regressors.16 Given that size and liquidity measures
have a signicant degree of correlation, we interpret this as a result of the size variable
picking up the impact of liquidity in the absence of the liquidity proxies. We also notice
that asset growth (proxy for investment) is lower for rms that pay dividends, supporting
the idea that payers commit to avoid or reduce risky investment. In Table 6, we take a
di¤erent econometric approach and provide panel data regression results, that conform with
the results derived from the Fama-MacBeth average coe¢ cients.
The results in Tables 4, 5 and 6 taken together provide strong support to our conjectures
that dividend-paying rms essentially commit not to take or reduce investment in risky
opportunities and this leads to reduced adverse selection and increased liquidity.
Additionally, as we argued before, this e¤ect should be especially important for rms
that have no access to cheap external nancing. We test this extension using the dummy
variables for highly leveraged rms (hi_lev1 and hi_lev2). Firms with these dummy
variables equaling 1 are deemed to have higher cost of external nancing and, if they pay
dividends, they forego investment opportunities. Therefore, the relationship between divi-
dend payments and liquidity should be more pronounced for these rms. The idea is that
paying dividends constrains these rms chances to invest in new projects. By doing so,
14Notice that these are in e¤ect measures of illiquidity, so a negative coe¢ cient implies a positive relation-
ship between liquidity and the probability of being a payer.
15Note that this ndings is in stark contrast to Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt (2007), who analyze the
relationship only in sub-periods rather than the whole sample. On a side note, their sample does not include
NASDAQ rms and the size variable they use is not the same as the one used here and in Fama and French
(2001), although these are unlikely to be the only reason for the di¤erence in the results.
16 In separate regressions, we use the logarithm of market capitalization as the measure of size. The results
turn out to be virtually identical.
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it reduces information asymmetries and improve liquidity. In summary, liquidity and the
probability of being a payer are related, and the relation is stronger for highly leveraged
rms.
In results not fully reported here for brevity (but available upon request from the au-
thors), we nd strong support for this conjecture. We run panel data regressions similar
to the ones in Table 5 using spread and proportion of zero return days as our liquidity
variables and adding to the set of explanatory variables the leverage dummy and then an
interaction between the dummy and the liquidity variable. No matter which dummy we
use, the results show that (i) highly-leveraged rms are less likely to be payers (that is,
the leverage dummy is signicantly and negatively related to the probability of being a
payer); (ii) liquidity is even more important in explaining the probability of being a payer
for highly-leveraged rms (that is, the interaction coe¢ cient is signicant, and negative and
the coe¢ cient on liquidity alone continues to be negative and signicant). Therefore, the
more liquid a rms stock is, the more likely it is that the rm is a payer, and this relation
is stronger if the rm has high leverage.
In order to address our last conjecture that the liquidity needs of shareholders matter
in the decision to pay dividends if management cares about them, we construct interaction
variables by multiplying the dummy for high shareholder power, DemDummy, by each
measure of liquidity (spread, proportion of zero return days, trading volume, and absolute
percentage price change per dollar trading volume) to obtain LiqGovP = PropZeroRet
DemDummy, LiqGovS = MeanSpread  DemDummy, LiqGovV = MeanV olume 
DemDummy, and LiqGovA = AmihudIlliq  DemDummy. The idea behind these
variables is that liquidity should matter when shareholdersinterests are taken into account
by the manager in making dividend payment decisions. Table 7 presents the results of logit
regressions by year where we add, one at a time, four measures that proxy for the fact
that shareholder power is of importance for the decision to pay dividends. Unfortunately,
the data for the governance index starts in 1991, hence we have to limit our sample. We
use two di¤erent samples: 1993-1998 (to compare with one of FFs results) and the whole
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sample 1991-2002. The results show that the interaction variable is indeed important in
determining the likelihood of a rm being a payer when the bid-ask spread or the price
impact of trades is used as a measure of stock illiquidity. The results are not as convincing
with the trade-based measures. The proportion of trading days with zero return and the
average trading volume do not produce signicant coe¢ cients in some specications.17 For
statistical completeness, we also run panel data logit regressions and present the results in
Table 8. Results stay basically the same with all measures of liquidity. We believe that
price-related measures (spread and Amihuds price impact variables) are a better proxy for
shareholders liquidity needs, since they are more direct proxies for the adverse selection
costs that shareholders incur when faced with a liquidity shock.
In order to establish a connection between these ndings and Baker and Wurglers work,
we create a new variable: the di¤erence in liquidity between payers and non-payers each
year. The intention is to capture the potential to improve liquidity by paying dividends, in
other words, to measure how much more liquidity a stock can enjoy if dividends start being
paid. Hence, we call this "liquidity gains from paying". Then we calculate the correlation
between this variable and Baker and Wurglers dividend premium. It is interesting to
notice that these variables are positively correlated: when dividend payers become more
expensive relative to non-payers, there is also a high likelihood that dividend payers are
becoming more liquid than non-payers.18 So, it may be the case that it is not the dividend
premium that drives the propensity to pay, but rather that the liquidity gains from paying
drives this propensity and at the same time leads to the dividend premium.
17For robustness, we repeat this exercise with di¤erent cut-o¤ points in the corporate governance index
for the democracy portfolio. The results remain qualitatively the same. We also run additional regressions
where we include both the interaction variable as well as the liquidity variable itself. Results suggest that,
at least for spread, liquidity has a direct e¤ect and an additional e¤ect for high-shareholder-power rms.
Put di¤erently, liquidity matters and even more so for rms with strong shareholders. Using other measures
of liquidity delivers mixed evidence.
18As an illustration, using spread as the measure of liquidity we have that the gains in liquidity (decrease
in spread) have a correlation of 0.2103 with the equally-weighted dividend premium and of 0.2379 with the
value-weighted premium. When we use proportion of zero return days, these numbers are even higher,
0.4885 and 0.3457, respectively. The reader should keep in mind that, since these measures are negatively
related to liquidity, we measure the liquidity gains as the variable for non-payers minus the variable for
payers (this is how much more liquid payers are relative to non-payers). So, the positive correlation means
that, when payers become pricier, they also become more liquid.
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As an additional robustness check, we employ a measure of informed-trading intensity
to see whether our results are driven by the fact that dividend payers tend to be big stocks
that are less likely to be prone to adverse selection due to informed traders. We use the
PIN variable, the probability that the opening trade is information-based, constructed by
Easley, Hvidkjaer and OHara (2002) to measure the intensity of informed-trading. As
shown in Table 9, the liquidity variable still turns out to be signicant. More interesting
is to see that, through the whole sample period, PIN is insignicant when no liquidity
and shareholder power variables enter the equation and its signicance is not much a¤ected
with the inclusion of liquidity proxies alone. Nevertheless, PIN gains signicance when
the governance interaction variables are introduced. Looking at the sub-sample period,
1993-1998, reinforces this observation. Also interesting to note is the fact that the gover-
nance interaction variable using the trade-based liquidity proxy is not signicant when the
information content of trades is considered. These ndings suggest that liquidity is rele-
vant beyond its relation to noise trading and asymmetric information and that shareholder
power is relevant to costs of trading rather than the level of trading activity itself.19
Table 10 briey addresses our models predictive power to complete comparison to FF.
Using the average coe¢ cients from 1963 to 1977, we calculate the predicted proportion of
payers and compare it with the actual one. We summarize the results in a table of sum of
squared residuals. For sake of comparison, we present FFs analogous results and cut the
sample in 1998. The t proves to be better than FFs, further suggesting that liquidity
proxies capture information relevant to dividend payment behavior.
As a nal note, we repeat the main regression analysis of Tables 5 and 6 using the
repurchase dummy instead of the dividend payment dummy as the dependent variable.
Satisfactorily enough, the results are qualitatively the same.20 Hence, we conrm that our
conjectures are valid for both types of distribution. An interesting interpretation is to note
that repurchases are free from the prudent investor bias. To put it more precisely, some
19Average trading volume and the percent price change per dollar volume produce similar results. The
results are excluded for brevity.
20The additional tables are excluded for sake of focus and brevity. The results are available upon request.
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funds are required to hold companies that pay dividends. If it is true that these funds are
also the ones that trade more frequently than the rest, then the shares of those companies
would mechanically have higher liquidity due to higher trading activity. This might lead
one to suspect that the relation between liquidity and being a dividend payer is merely a
correlation rather than one that is driven by the dynamics explained in our conjectures. On
the other hand, there is no requirement for funds to hold companies that engage in share
repurchases. Hence, verifying that our results stand with repurchase data gives further
support to our conjectures.
As for the results that have been tested elsewhere in the literature, we observe that in
Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) rms are shown to be signaling the past, and this
ts with the current paper. More precisely, in their paper, it is empirically shown that
rms paying/increasing dividends have experienced an increase in earnings, but do not show
unexpected increases in the future. On the other hand, rms that cut dividends experience
decrease in earnings in the past, but show signicant increases in the future. This evidence
is consistent with the idea that dividend-paying rms have no investment opportunity worth
their while, and that is why they payout. In order to pay dividends the rm needs to have a
free cash-ow (D), hence needs to have experienced an increase in earnings. Nevertheless,
in agreement with their ndings, these rms are not expected to show any further increase
(as mentioned, they have little growth prospects). Similarly, rms that decide not to pay
dividends experience a decrease in earnings due to the fact that D in funds are diverted to
the available investment opportunities. Since these investment opportunities are ex-ante
protable, we have that, in conformity with their results, these rms are expected to show
signicant increase in earnings in the future. In another study, Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell
(2008) nd that poorly-governed rms are unlikely to initiate or increase dividends, in line
with our ndings. Hence, part of our conjectures have empirical support in the existing
literature. Yet, our ndings in support of the conjecture that dividend payment probability
and stock market liquidity are negatively related are in constrast with Banerjee, Gatchev,
and Spindt (2007). Their empirical analysis looks only to sub-periods (1963-1977, 1978-
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1992, 1993-2003) while we show that the sign of the relationship is reversed in the whole
sample period. Therefore, we demonstrate that the interaction between dividends and
stock market liquidity may be di¤erent than what has so far been depicted in the literature.
IV Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the interaction between a rms payout policy and its stocks
market liquidity. We nd that (i) dividend-paying rms have a more liquid market; (ii)
non-payers are more volatile; (iii) there is a positive relationship between investment and
adverse selection costs; (iv) liquidity is positively related to the propensity to pay dividends;
(v) the relationship between liquidity and dividends is stronger for rms with stronger
shareholder power. These ndings are robust to di¤erent liquidity measures and several
robustness checks. We o¤er a mechanism that could explain these results together: by
distributing cash, the rm reduces its chances of exploiting investment opportunities as
funds for internal nancing are used up, which decreases the volatility of stock returns and
adverse selection costs faced by liquidity-constrained shareholders, leading to more liquid
markets for the rms stock.
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A Appendix
The appendix presents a simple model to support the conjectures in the text. All proofs
are omitted but available upon request.
Our economy has a representative rm, traded in an imperfectly competitive market.
The rm is initially, at time t = 0, endowed with an average amount of D per share. The
decision faced by the manager is whether to pay outD as dividends or to hold on to the cash.
If the rm pays dividends, then its nal value is distributed as eV0  N(; 2). Otherwise,
the rm has an option to invest. With probability 1   p, it has a protable investment
opportunity with cost D. With complementary probability p, no opportunity presents
itself, and hence, there is no investment. If investment takes place, the rms nal value is
given by a random variable eVI with C.D.F. F (:) to be specied below. If no investment
takes place, then its nal value is given by eV0+D.21 The intuition behind the assumption
that paying dividends constrains rms not to invest was discussed in Section II.
Let eVg be the random variable that represents the mixture described above. More
precisely, it is a lottery that with probability 1   p gives eVI and with complementary
probability gives eV0 +D. Then, we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For p small enough, there exists a C.D.F. F (:) such that eVg is distributed
N(I + ; 
2
I + 
2).
We assume that the parameter values satisfy the conditions for Proposition 1 and F (:)
is depicted accordingly. We further impose that I > D so that the opportunity to wait
and invest is ex-ante expected to be protable. In other words, the option to invest
is not worthless. Therefore, a rm that decides to keep its option to invest has eVg 
N(I + ; 
2
I + 
2) as its nal value. Otherwise, it becomes a "payer". Since dividends
are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, we assume that only a fraction  2 (0; 1] of
21This description should be seen as a reduced form of a situation where there is a whole distribution over
the set of possible investment opportunities and one of these materializes. The support of this set is such
that some opportunities would be undertaken if presented to the manager, some would not. For all intents
and purposes of this paper, this situation can be interpreted analogously to the one described in the text.
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D accrues to the stockholders.22
We allow for the existence of K shareholders, that are assumed to be risk-neutral.23
Each shareholder is endowed with  shares of the company. So, if the company becomes a
payer, each shareholder would get D in dividends. Hence, we have a representative rm
that chooses to be one of two types, non-payer or payer, and the payo¤s to the shareholders
are  eVg and  eV0 + D, respectively.
Next, we introduce a potential need for liquidity on the part of the shareholders by
modelling the market as a modication of Kyle (1985), where the liquidity traders are now
shareholders. More precisely, we assume that each shareholder has an additional demand
(or supply) of euk  i:i:d:N(0; 2u), independently distributed of all other random variables.
Therefore, if euk < (>)0, they might need to sell (buy) some shares in the market. The
market participants are the shareholders, the informed trader, and the market maker.
We assume that when markets are open for trading no market participant (with the
exception of the informed trader) has information concerning the investment opportunity.
All agents observe if a rm has paid dividends or not, but they do not know whether or
not it had a lucky draw of the investment lottery (protable opportunity is present or not).
The informed trader is specialized in the stock of a particular company and has perfect
information concerning its payo¤. The market maker observes the total order ow and
behaves in a competitive manner as if facing free entry by other market makers. Hence,
the market for the stock is exactly as in a Kyle-type model with the liquidity traders
supplyingeu =PKk=1 euk.
Dividends are announced before there is any trading in the market, but paid when payo¤s
realize and only to early shareholders. Dividends are paid to agents that hold shares at
that point. Hence, informed traders do not receive dividends and shareholders receive
22We introduce  if one needs to discuss the tax code changes. From a parsimonious point of view, the
results would not change if  = 1.
23We also show that the main intuition is maintained when shareholders are risk-averse. These results
are available upon request.
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dividends only on their preexisting  shares.24 ;25 This is merely a simplifying assumption
without any real consequences for the model. If dividends were paid earlier, shareholders
might be able to use them to cover part of their liquidity needs, euk. Although the main
intuition would remain, the analysis would be less straightforward. Alternatively, we could
redene euk to mean liquidity needs above and beyond any money they might have, so euk
would represent how many shares they have to buy (sell) in the market. An equivalent
way to think about this is that the dividends are paid out in the rst period but stay in a
non-interest-bearing account.
Since shareholders trade against informed agents when hit by the liquidity shock, they
face a market with adverse selection costs. These costs will be shown to be a function of the
characteristics of the rm. In turn, it is the choice of the rms type, payer or non-payer,
that shapes these characteristics. Accordingly, we also demonstrate that, when deciding
to pay dividends, the rm takes the liquidity needs of its shareholders into account.
We rst proceed with the analysis of the market equilibrium, and then analyze the
decision of the rm regarding its type. But before, we present the main ingredients of the
model in Figure 1 below. In a simple time-line, we start when a rm with K shareholders
makes the decision to be a dividend payer or not. Then, the investment opportunities are
presented and the rm takes on an investment opportunity if it has the resources to do
so. This stage is observed by the informed trader, but not the other market participants.
Finally, the shareholders are hit by liquidity shocks and trading takes place. Given this
description one can think about the dividend (payout) policy as a sort of commitment
device. Once a payout is announced, the manager commits himself not to undertake risky
investments. This, as we show below, reduces the potential adverse selection (and trading)
costs of liquidity-strapped shareholders.
24 If they buy shares (uk > 0), these are not going to receive dividends, and even if they sell some of their
 shares (uk < 0), the amount paid is in proportion to .
25 If informed traders already owned shares, they would also receive dividends. This would not change
the results. We would only need to consider their net demand, i.e., if they had x shares and in the current
equilibrium they demand y shares, then their "modied" market order would be y   x. As long as x is
known by the market maker, the equilibrium would be exactly as described here. If x was unknown and
viewed as random by the market maker, this could be modeled as additional noise trading. Either way, the
qualitative results follow as below.
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t=1
Securities Market
 - Market makers observe
Unobservable to market participants, order flow in each market.
except informed traders
 - Liquidity shocks occur.
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Investment Opportunity StageDividend Decision
Figure 1: A Brief Description of the Model
0.1 Securities Market Equilibrium
Suppose the rm has decided not to pay dividends and retain earnings. So, the option to
invest is still viable and the rm is now tagged as a non-payer. Using the notation laid out
in the previous section, we derive the equilibrium in the non-payer market.26 In the next
section, we go back and look at the endogenous payout policy decision.
The non-payers stock can be viewed as a risky asset paying eVg  N(I + ; 2I + 2).
As mentioned above, we assume that an insider has knowledge of eVg before the rest of the
market. The market maker observes eg + eu where we let eg denote the insiders demand
for the growth stock. In what follows, we concentrate on linear equilibria. The insiders
problem is then maxg E
h
g
eVg   Pg jVgi, where he conjectures that Pg = Pg  g + eu =
Pg + g
 
g + eu. The market makers problem is setting prices in a way that gives him
zero expected prots, and he conjectures eg = Bg + g eVg. Therefore, in equilibrium two
conditions must be satised:
1. Prot Maximization: E
heVg   Pg  g + eugjVgi  E heVg   Pg  0g + eu0gjVgi
for every 0g and for any realization of the random variable in his information set.
2. Semi-Strong Market E¢ ciency : Prices are set by the market maker in a way that:
Pg
eg + eu = E heVgjeg + eui :
26As it will be clear soon, this part of the model is a slight modication of the market in Kyle (1985).
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For a rm that pays dividends, the equilibrium conditions are qualitatively identical to
the ones we have just explored, with the relevant notation being modied accordingly. We
state the equilibrium for both payers and non-payers in the next proposition following the
same lines as Proposition 1 in Kyle (1985).
Proposition 2 A linear equilibrium of the market for the non-payers stock has the follow-
ing form
Pg = Pg + g
eg + eu ; eg = Bg + g eVg;
where Pg = I + ; g =
p
2I+
2
2u
p
K
; Bg =   (I + )g and g = u
p
Kp
2I+
2
. And, for the
payers stock we have
Pv = Pv + v
ev + eu ; ev = Bv + v eV0;
where Pv = ; v =

2u
p
K
; Bv =  v; v = u
p
K
 :
The depth of the market for the non-payers stock can therefore be seen to equal 1g =
2u
p
Kp
2I+
2
. Hence, the more volatile the new investment opportunity, the lower is this stocks
market depth. So, one can assert that, a growth stock is as liquid as its growth opportunities
are safe. We can also calculate the expected prot of the insider as g =
u
p
K
p
2I+
2
2 .
Since this is a zero-sum market, this is the aggregate loss to the shareholders of the growth
rm. The depth of the market for the payers stock is 1v =
2u
p
K
 . And, the aggregate
losses of shareholders is given by v = u
p
K
2 . Now, we can compare the characteristics of
each market/stock.
Proposition 3 (i) Non-payers have more volatile stock prices than payers;
(ii) The market for non-payers is thinner (less liquid);
(iii) Adverse selection costs are higher in the market for non-payersstocks.
It should also be clear from the model that the investment opportunities of a company
are the determinant of the degree of adverse selection. It is the growth opportunities of
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non-payers that leads to adverse selection. This observation coupled with Proposition 3
provides the theoretical underpinning of our rst three conjectures. In the next section,
we analyze the payout policy decision.
0.2 Dividend Payment Decision
Consider a rm that is managed by a manager, who cares about the well-being of the
shareholders, as well as his own. His reward is a function of the companys nal payo¤. For
simplicity, we assume that he owns m shares of the company. Di¤erently than shareholders
though, he is not hit by liquidity shocks.
We postulate that the manager attaches weight 	 to the shareholdersper-capita well-
being and complementary weight on his own well-being. This parameter characterizes
the type of manager and in an economy with many rms can be thought to vary within
the population of managers. When deciding on whether or not to pay dividends, he
maximizes a weighted average of his expected utility and shareholdersper-capita expected
utility (trading o¤ generality for tractability, we assume that all agents are identical and
risk-neutral). Furthermore, we make an assumption on the parameters of the problem to
generate conict between shareholders and managers. This implies that, in the current
representative agent set-up, the shareholders as a group would be better o¤ in a dividend-
paying rm. However, as mentioned before, the decision whether to pay dividends or not
is not under their control.27
Assumption 1: Let the parameters of the model satisfy
u
2
p
K
q
2I + 
2   

> (I   D)
P
k k
K

: (1)
The rst expression on the left-hand side can be seen as the average liquidity risk.
27More importantly, in a slightly modied model we could have additional agents that prefer non-paying
rms (for instance, agents with enough resources, without liquidity needs). Also, informed traders prot
from trading on non-paying rms so, they would be willing to hold these rms. Therefore, types of rms
would have positive demand. However, we do not model the choice of shareholders to hold payers or non-
payers. We assume that some agents hold shares in a company and then this company, when it has enough
retained earnings, must decide whether or not to pay dividends.
31
The second expression denotes the extra risk added by keeping the option to invest alive
rather than paying dividends. On the right-hand side, we have the expected excess return
from investment and average number of shares, respectively. In essence, Assumption 1
constraints the net gains, for shareholders, from having a stock with growth potential to be
smaller than the net gains from holding a payers stock and collecting dividend payments.
Given the previous discussion, we know that, if the rm becomes a payer, the aggregate
payo¤ for its shareholders (excluding the manager) is
P
k
h
k
eV0 + D+ euk eV0   Pvi,
where the rst term represents all their gains on pre-existing shares and the last term reects
aggregate adverse selection costs imposed on them by the fact that they face a market in
which they trade against an informed trader. If we substitute for the functional form of
the stock price and take unconditional expectations with respect to all random variables,
we obtain the expected aggregate prots of shareholders of a dividend-paying rm
v := E
X
k
h
k
eV0 + D+ euk eV0   Pvi =X
k
k (+ D) 
u
p
K
2
:
One can follow exactly the same lines in order to obtain the expected aggregate prots for
the shareholders if the manager decides to turn his company into a non-payer. This gives
us
g := E
X
k
h
k eVg + euk eVg   Pgi =X
k
k (+ I) 
q
2I + 
2u
p
K
2
:
Finally, given the managers objectives, he is only interested in two quantities, namely,
	
v
K
+ (1 	)m (+ D) and 	g
K
+ (1 	)m (+ I) :
The rst expression is the weighted average of his and the shareholderspayo¤ of having
the rm be a payer. The second expression is the counterpart for the case of a non-payer.
We are now ready to provide the main results of this section.
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Proposition 4 A manager decides to pay dividends if and only if
	
u
2
p
K
q
2I + 
2   

> (I   D)

m+	
P
k k
K
 m

:
Notice that if 	 = 0 the inequality in the proposition is violated, because I > D >
D by assumption. Therefore, a purely individualistic manager will never decide to pay
dividends. On the other side of the spectrum, 	 = 1, we have the opposite result. If a
rm is managed by its own (potentially liquidity-constrained) shareholders, it always pays
dividends. Furthermore, notice that the inequality can be rewritten as
	

u
2
p
K
q
2I + 
2   

  (I   D)
P
k k
K
 m

> (I   D)m:
Given (1), we know that the term inside the square brackets is positive. Hence, we can
rewrite the inequality once more, as
	 >
(I   D)m
u
2
p
K
q
2I + 
2   

  (I   D)
P
k k
K  m
 =: 	:
Then, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The decision to initiate dividends depends on how much weight the manager
puts on the liquidity needs of the shareholders, i.e., the manager pays dividends if and only
if 	 > 	 2 (0; 1).
To clarify the main intuition of the discussion so far, suppose that the average share-
holder and the manager have identical stakes in the company, i.e.,
P
k k
K = m. Un-
der this specication, the condition for payment of dividends to be optimal simplies to
	 > (I D)m
u
2
p
K
p
2I+
2 
 =: 	 2 (0; 1). Notice that the denominator of 	 is the per-capita
amount saved by the shareholders due to a more liquid market for value stocks, and its
numerator is proportional to their net gains from having a stock with growth potential.
Hence, the higher the importance of having a liquid stock, the higher the denominator.
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This lowers 	 and it becomes more likely that the manager will pay dividends. On
the other hand, as the investment opportunity becomes more protable, the numerator
increases decreasing the likelihood of the rm paying dividends.
So, the results above provide the nal theoretical underpinning for our conjectures,
more precisely, that liquidity matters for the decision to pay dividends and especially so if
shareholders have more power (this summarizes conjectures 4 and 5).
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
The table presents the descriptive statistics of the data set. Panel A shows the sta-
tistics for dividend payment behavior. pay is a dummy variable that takes on the value
1 if the rm has paid a dividend in a given year. Proportion of payers in the second row
is calculated separately for each period in the sample, so on average 39.71% of rms pay
dividends in a given year over the 41-year sample period. Panel B presents the statistics
for the right-hand-side variables used in the regressions. AG is asset growth, EperA is
earnings per assets, V perA is value per assets, MCRank is size measured by the percent
rank in market capitalization. Liquidity is measured by four alternative variables: the pro-
portion of days in a month in which the companys stock does not experience a price change
(PropZeroRet), the average daily spread over the month (MeanSpread), the average daily
volume in logs over the month (MeanV olume), an illiquidity measure (AmihudIlliq) calcu-
lated as described in Amihud (2002). Panel C displays the corrrelation coe¢ cients among
these alternative liquidity measures.
Panel A. Dividend Payment Tendency
NObs Mean StdDev
pay (=1 if payer) 148,403 0.3937 0.4886
Proportion of payers 41 0.3971 0.1711
Panel B. Main Variables in the Regressions
Payers (P) Non-Payers (NP)
Variable NObs Mean StdDev NObs Mean StdDev
AG 54,682 0.08 0.23 74,153 0.01 5.67
EperA 54,047 0.09 0.07 81,539 -0.04 0.34
V perA 56,657 1.40 0.97 83,860 2.19 3.04
MCRank 50,206 0.60 0.28 77,832 0.44 0.27
PropZeroRet 58,382 0.24 0.20 89,924 0.30 0.23
MeanSpread 58,260 0.03 0.04 88,807 0.09 0.13
MeanV olume 51,081 12.51 2.45 80,449 11.73 2.63
AmihudIlliq 51,080 1.78 17.66 80,437 14.18 108.22
All
NObs Mean StdDev
128,836 0.04 4.30
135,586 0.01 0.27
140,517 1.87 2.46
128,038 0.50 0.29
148,306 0.28 0.22
147,067 0.07 0.10
131,530 12.03 2.59
131,517 9.37 85.56
Panel C. Correlation Between Liquidity Measures
 =
2664
1      
21 1    
31 32 1  
41 42 43 1
3775 =
2664
1      
0:1105 1    
 0:6747 0:0118 1  
0:2711 0:1442  0:3413 1
3775 ;
where ij is the correlation between variable i and variable j (1 = PropZeroRet, 2 =
MeanSpread, 3 =MeanV olume, 4 = AmihudIlliq)
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Table 2. Testing Liquidity Di¤erences
The table presents a test of the conjecture that rms that pay dividends are more liquid
than non-paying rms. Payers and non-payers are distinguished based on the pay variable
that takes on the value 1 if the rm has paid a dividend in a given year and are matched
based on their asset growth (AG) and size (MCRank, measured as the percent rank in
market capitalization). We use four alternative measures of liquidity. First, as the primary
measure, we use the proportion of days in a month in which the companys stock does
not experience a price change (PropZeroRet). Second, we use the average daily spread
(MeanSpread). Third, we use the average daily volume in logs (MeanV olume). Finally,
we use an illiquidity measure (AmihudIlliq), calculated as described in Amihud (2002).
The test using PropZeroRet is a binomial test, while the others are conventional tests of
the di¤erences in the mean of two populations. The nal column shows the 95 % condence
interval for the di¤erence in liquidity (non-payersliquidity minus payersliquidity). The
lower panel of the table shows the results of the testing the same conjecture after controlling
for size, where the respective liquidity measure is regressed on size, MCRank, the dividend
payment dummy, pay, and a constant. Hence, the intercept corresponds to the coe¢ cient
on the dummy plus the constant for payers, and just the constant for non-payers. The
t-statistic reported in the last column is for the coe¢ cient on the dividend payment dummy.
Panel A. Matched Pairs
Payers (P) Non-Payers (NP) Test
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Result Conf. Interval
PropZeroRet 0.243 0.197 0.304 0.233 NP less liq. (0.056,0.066)
MeanSpread 0.034 0.037 0.088 0.126 NP less liq. (0.053,0.055)
MeanV olume 12.511 2.453 11.729 2.634 NP less liq. (-0.819,-0.744)
AmihudIlliq 1.779 17.658 14.182 108.22 NP less liq. (11.159,13.646)
Panel B. Regression with Control for Size
Payers (P) Non-Payers (NP) MCRank-Controlled "Test"
Variable Intercept Std Dev Intercept Std Dev Result t-stat
PropZeroRet 0.3536 0.0023 0.4402 0.0019 NP less liq. -17.91
MeanSpread 0.1256 0.0013 0.2574 0.0015 NP less liq. -50.05
MeanV olume 8.3774 0.0120 8.1647 0.0202 NP less liq. 14.72
AmihudIlliq 7.6577 0.5776 42.9611 0.7232 NP less liq. -8.55
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Table 3. Testing Volatility Di¤erences
The table tests the implication that payers are less volatile than non-payers using three
variables: Earnings per assets (EperA), value per assets (V perA) and the rmsstock price.
Payers and non-payers are distinguished based on the pay variable that takes on the value 1
if the rm has paid a dividend in a given year and are matched based on their asset growth
(AG) and size (MCRank, measured as the percent rank in market capitalization). Panel
A shows the results of a test comparing the variance across two sub-samples, payers versus
non-payers, ignoring the time dimension so payers in any given year are assumed to share
the same properties. Panel B, in contrast, compares the volatility of a typical payer to
that of a typical non-payer through time, where "typical" refers to a company characterized
by the average value of the variable of interest (EperA, V perA, or Price) at every point
in time. For robustness, we repeat the tests with the median values and obtain similar
results (results not reported for brevity). The number reported in the last column is the
upper bound of a 99% condence interval constructed for the ratio of standard deviation
of relevant variable for payers over that for non-payers. The upper bound being below 1
indicates that payers are less volatile. Panel C summarizes the signicance of the coe¢ cient
on pay in a regression where volatility over the sample period is regressed on the average
values of pay dummy, size, asset growth, and an industry dummy.
Panel A. Total Dispersion
Payers (P) Non-Payers (NP) Test
Variable Std Dev Std Dev Result Boundary
EperA 0.064 0.335 P less volatile 0.192
V perA 0.966 3.042 P less volatile 0.318
Price 23.644 591.57 P less volatile 0.040
Panel B. Dispersion Across Time
Payers (P) Non-Payers (NP) Test
Variable Std Dev Std Dev Result Boundary
EperA 0.011 0.068 P less volatile 0.162
V perA 0.250 0.566 P less volatile 0.442
Price 7.308 8.249 P less volatile 0.886
Panel C. Regression
Volatility regressed on pay and controls
Variable Coe¢ cient Std Dev t-stat
EperA -0.099 0.001 -89.92
V perA -0.854 0.010 -84.92
Price -7.948 2.043 -3.89
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Table 4. Analyzing the Relationship between Investment and Adverse
Selection
The table presents the results of panel data regressions where we use PIN , a measure
of adverse selection dened as the probability that the opening trade is information-based
and measured by the fraction of orders that arise from informed traders, as the dependent
variable and asset growth (AG) as a proxy for investment and control for earnings per
assets (EperA), value per assets (V perA), size (measured by MCRank dened as percent
rank in market capitalization), and measures of liquidity (PropZeroRet and AmihudIlliq).
We also use an alternative measure of investment (Inv) as dened in Rajan and Zingales
(1998) instead of AG for robustness. We refer the reader to Easley, Hvidkjaer and OHara
(2002) for detailed information on the construction of PIN from transactions data. PIN
is available for the period between 1983 and 2001. The absolute value of robust t-statistics
are in parentheses and * means signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at
1%.
Panel Data Regression Results: 1983-2001
Dependent variable: PIN
Specication 1 2 3 4 5
AG 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.015***
(7.75) (10.38) (7.84)
EperA 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.029*** 0.026***
(4.11) (5.92) (4.78) (7.18) (6.13)
V perA -0.001** 0.001** -0.001** 0.001 -0.001**
(1.97) (2.31) (2.22) (1.42) (2.22)
MCRank -0.144*** -0.103*** -0.142*** -0.100*** -0.139***
(64.89) (41.90) (63.72) (29.87) (46.35)
PropZeroRet 0.146*** 0.152***
(33.72) (24.53)
AmihudIlliq 0.021*** 0.027***
(4.04) (3.66)
Inv 0.003*** 0.002***
(4.70) (2.99)
Constant 0.297*** 0.241*** 0.293*** 0.236*** 0.287***
(203.13) (109.91) (162.08) (76.92) (114.57)
Observations 27,857 27,857 27,857 13,654 13,654
38
Table 5. Analyzing the Relationship between Dividend Payment and Liquidity
Fama-MacBeth Regressions
The table presents the results of logit regressions by year where we use the same set of
variables as Fama and French (2001) with the exception that we add, one at a time, four
alternative measures of liquidity. The dependent variable is pay, where a rm that paid
dividends in a given year has a value of 1, a non-payer has a value of zero. AG is asset
growth, EperA is earnings per assets, V perA is value per assets, MCRank is size mea-
sured by the percent rank in market capitalization. The four alternative liquidity measures
are: the proportion of days in a month in which the companys stock does not experience
a price change (PropZeroRet), the average daily spread over the month (MeanSpread),
the average daily volume in logs over the month (MeanV olume), an illiquidity measure
(AmihudIlliq) calculated as described in Amihud (2002). We present the means across
years of the regression intercepts and slopes, and the absolute value of t-statistics for the
means in parentheses. These statistics are dened as the mean of the coe¢ cient divided
by its standard error, that is, the time-series standard deviation of the regression coe¢ cient
divided by the square root of the number of years in the period, in line with Fama and
MacBeth (1973). When calculating these averages, we use two di¤erent sample periods:
the same as in FF (until 1998) and our whole sample. The rst column, Specication
1, reproduces FFs results for ease of comparison. Specications 2-5 display our results
with PropZeroRet, MeanSpread, MeanV olume; AmihudIlliq as proxies for liquidity, re-
spectively, for the same sample period, 1963-1998. Specications 6-9 present our results
for the extended sample period, 1963-2002. The t-statistics reported in the table are not
adjusted. However, we recalculate these using Newey-West and Shanken corrections. The
new t-statistics, although lower than the unadjusted counterparts, still indicate signicance
at virtually the same levels. We report the unadjusted statistics in order to be comparable
to FFs results. * denotes signicance at 10%; ** signicance at 5%; *** signicance at
1%. The R2 presented is the average of the yearly regressionsR2.
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Table 6. Analyzing the Relationship between Dividend Payment and Liquidity
Panel Data Results
The table presents the results of panel data logit regressions for Specications 6-9 in
Table 5. The dependent variable is pay, where a rm that paid dividends in a given year
has a value of 1, a non-payer has a value of zero. AG is asset growth, EperA is earnings per
assets, V perA is value per assets, MCRank is size measured by the percent rank in market
capitalization. The four alternative liquidity measures are: the proportion of days in a
month in which the companys stock does not experience a price change (PropZeroRet), the
average daily spread over the month (MeanSpread), the average daily volume in logs over
the month (MeanV olume), an illiquidity measure (AmihudIlliq) calculated as described
in Amihud (2002). The absolute value of robust t-statistics are in parentheses and * means
signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
Panel Data Regression Results: 1963-2002
Dependent variable: pay
Specication 1 2 3 4
AG -0.18*** -0.31*** -0.15*** -0.19***
(4.33) (7.17) (3.54) (4.44)
EperA 7.64*** 6.05*** 7.67*** 7.50***
(39.31) (30.84) (39.45) (39.39)
V perA -0.57*** -0.50*** -0.53*** -0.54***
(29.46) (26.36) (26.77) (28.33)
MCRank 2.62*** 2.48*** 3.46*** 2.97***
(21.49) (32.66) (23.72) (28.30)
PropZeroRet -2.15***
(16.24)
MeanSpread -42.68***
(46.93)
MeanV olume -0.03*
(1.66)
AmihudIlliq -0.02***
(13.96)
Constant -2.41*** -1.11*** -3.17*** -3.10***
(22.46) (18.21) (21.29) (41.48)
Observations 127,412 127,412 127,412 127,412
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Table 7. Adding Shareholder Power
Fama-MacBeth Regressions
The table presents the results of logit regressions by year where we use the same set of
variables as Fama and French (2001) with the exception that we add, one at a time, four
alternative measures that proxy for the fact that shareholder power is of importance for the
decision to pay dividends. The dependent variable is pay, where a rm that paid dividends
in a given year has a value of 1, a non-payer has a value of zero. AG is asset growth, EperA
is earnings per assets, V perA is value per assets, MCRank is size measured by the percent
rank in market capitalization. The four alternative liquidity measures are: the propor-
tion of days in a month in which the companys stock does not experience a price change
(PropZeroRet), the average daily spread over the month (MeanSpread), the average
daily volume in logs over the month (MeanV olume), an illiquidity measure (AmihudIlliq)
calculated as described in Amihud (2002). The proxy for the impact of shareholder
power in relation with liquidity is LiqGovP (LiqGovS, LiqGovV , LiqGovA), an interac-
tion variable constructed as PropZeroRetDemDummy (MeanSpreadDemDummy,
MeanV olume DemDummy, AmihudIlliq DemDummy), where DemDummy is 1 if
corporate governance index, GIndex, is smaller than or equal to 5 and 0 otherwise. The
governance index is a variable adapted from Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). It is
constructed using the incidence of 24 governance rules to proxy for the level of shareholder
rights. The rms with strongest rights are called democracyrms. These democracy
rms are the ones that have DemDummy = 1. The data for the governance index start in
1991, hence we have to limit the sample. We use two sub-samples: 1993-1998 (to compare
with FFs results) and 1991-2002. We present the means across years of the regression
intercepts and slopes, and the absolute value of t-statistics for the means in parentheses.
These statistics are dened as the mean of the coe¢ cient divided by its standard error,
that is, the time-series standard deviation of the regression coe¢ cient divided by the square
root of the number of years in the period, in line with Fama and MacBeth (1973). The
rst column, Specication 1, reproduces FFs results for ease of comparison. Specications
2-5 display our results with PropZeroRet, MeanSpread, MeanV olume; AmihudIlliq as
proxies for liquidity, respectively, for the same sample period, 1993-1998. Specications 6-9
present our results for the extended sample period, 1991-2002. The t-statistics reported in
the table are not adjusted. However, we recalculate these using Newey-West and Shanken
corrections. The new t-statistics, although lower than the unadjusted counterparts, still
indicate signicance at virtually the same levels. We report the unadjusted statistics in
order to be comparable to FFs results. * denotes signicance at 10%; ** signicance at
5%; *** signicance at 1%. The R2 presented is the average of the yearly regressionsR2.
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Table 8. Adding Shareholder Power
Panel Data Results
The table presents the results of panel data logit regressions for Specications 6-9 in
Table 5. The dependent variable is pay, where a rm that paid dividends in a given year
has a value of 1, a non-payer has a value of zero. AG is asset growth, EperA is earnings per
assets, V perA is value per assets, MCRank is size measured by the percent rank in mar-
ket capitalization. The four alternative liquidity measures are: the proportion of days in a
month in which the companys stock does not experience a price change (PropZeroRet), the
average daily spread over the month (MeanSpread), the average daily volume in logs over
the month (MeanV olume), an illiquidity measure (AmihudIlliq) calculated as described
in Amihud (2002). The proxy for the impact of shareholder power in relation with liq-
uidity is LiqGovP (LiqGovS, LiqGovV , LiqGovA), an interaction variable constructed as
PropZeroRetDemDummy (MeanSpreadDemDummy,MeanV olumeDemDummy,
AmihudIlliq  DemDummy), where DemDummy is 1 if corporate governance index,
GIndex, is smaller than or equal to 5 and 0 otherwise. The governance index is a vari-
able adapted from Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). It is constructed using the inci-
dence of 24 governance rules to proxy for the level of shareholder rights. The rms with
strongest rights are called democracyrms. These democracy rms are the ones that
have DemDummy = 1. The data for the governance index start in 1991, hence we have to
limit the sample. The absolute value of robust t-statistics are in parentheses and * means
signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
Panel Data Regression Results: 1991-2002
Dependent variable: pay
Specication 1 2 3 4
AG -0.32* -0.23 -0.31* -0.32**
(1.95) (1.23) (1.87) (1.98)
EperA 3.13*** 4.11*** 3.26*** 3.23***
(3.66) (4.60) (3.70) (3.73)
V perA -0.10 0.14** -0.07 -0.10
(1.28) (2.01) (0.78) (1.24)
MCRank 5.35*** 4.99*** 5.23*** 5.11***
(10.41) (8.70) (10.63) (10.53)
LiqGovP -1.05
(0.66)
LiqGovS -35.40***
(5.51)
LiqGovV 0.03
(1.28)
LiqGovA -0.18
(1.56)
Constant -3.42*** -2.87*** -3.27*** -3.19***
(7.89) (6.10) (7.95) (7.99)
Observations 38,475 38,475 38,475 38,475
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Table 9. Adding Intensity of Informed Trading
The table presents the results of logit regressions with the same independent variables
as in FF and the measures of liquidity, however, we add a new variable, PIN , to control
for the degree of informed trading. PIN is a measure of adverse selection dened as the
probability that the opening trade is information-based and measured by the fraction of
orders that arise from informed traders. We refer the reader to Easley, Hvidkjaer and
OHara (2002) for detailed information on the construction of PIN from transactions data.
PIN is available for the period between 1983 and 2001. The dependent variable is pay,
where a rm that paid dividends in a given year has a value of 1, a non-payer has a value of
zero. AG is asset growth, EperA is earnings per assets, V perA is value per assets,MCRank
is size measured by the percent rank in market capitalization. The two alternative liquidity
measures are: the proportion of days in a month in which the companys stock does not
experience a price change (PropZeroRet) and the average daily spread over the month
(MeanSpread). We also introdue proxies for the impact of shareholder power in relation
with liquidity: LiqGovP and LiqGovS, interaction variables constructed as PropZeroRet
DemDummy and MeanSpread  DemDummy, respectively, where DemDummy is 1 if
corporate governance index, GIndex, is smaller than or equal to 5 and 0 otherwise. The
governance index is a variable adapted from Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). It is
constructed using the incidence of 24 governance rules to proxy for the level of shareholder
rights. The rms with strongest rights are called democracyrms. These democracy
rms are the ones that have DemDummy = 1. The data for the governance index start
in 1991, hence we have to limit the sample further when we use these interaction variables.
Panel A displays the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions, where the means across years
of the regression intercepts and slopes and the absolute value of t-statistics for the means
(in parentheses) are summarized. These statistics are dened as the mean of the coe¢ cient
divided by its standard error, that is, the time-series standard deviation of the regression
coe¢ cient divided by the square root of the number of years in the period, in line with Fama
and MacBeth (1973). Specications 1-3 run from 1983 to 2001, and specications 4-5 run
from 1991 to 2001. To enhance comparability to FFs results, regressions over the period
1993-1998 are shown in specications 6-10. The t-statistics reported in the table are not
adjusted. However, we recalculate these using Newey-West and Shanken corrections. The
new t-statistics, although lower than the unadjusted counterparts, still indicate signicance
at virtually the same levels. We report the unadjusted statistics in order to be comparable
to FFs results. Panel B presents the results of panel data logit regressions for the same
specications as in Panel A. The absolute value of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *
denotes signicance at 10%; ** signicance at 5%; *** signicance at 1%.
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Table 10. Expected Versus Realized Proportion of Payers
An Out-of-Sample Analysis
The table presents the results of a prediction exercise. We rst use all rms in our sample
for each year of the 1963-77 base period to estimate logit regressions that explain whether
a rm pays dividends based on the baseline specication with two alternative liquidity
measures, MeanSpread and PropZeroRet, and obtain two di¤erent sets of coe¢ cients.
We then calculate the expected percent of payers in year t by applying the average logit
coe¢ cients for the 1963-77 base period to the explanatory variables for each rm at year t,
summing over rms, dividing by the number of rms and multiplying by 100. Finally, we
compute the error as predicted minus the observed percentage of payers. ERR_P (_S) is
the sum of squared errors based on the regressions using PropZeroRet (MeanSpread) as
the liquidity measure and ERR_FF is the error reported by FF. We present the results
for two sub-samples (78-98 and 82-98) to highlight the fact that our model performs much
better in the 82-98 period. We also include the minimum improvement we achieve over FF
(their error minus our highest error). We do not report the results using the whole sample
(until 2002) to keep the results comparable to those of FF, but these are available upon
request.
Period ERR_P ERR_S ERR_FF Minimum Improvement
1978-98 4868.73 5406.70 5656.42 249.72
1982-98 2884.57 3016.15 5592.46 2576.31
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